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Siri, Amazon Echo, Google Home and the like are now
commonplace Personal Voice Assistants (PVAs). They are
integrated in mobile phones (Siri, Cortana), consumer elec-
tronics such as TVs (SkyQ) and are also used as stand-alone
devices (Amazon Echo, Google Home). PVAs are sometimes
also referred to as Smart Speakers or Voice Controllable
System (VCS). PVAs continuously monitor conversations and
may transport conversation elements to a cloud back end where
speech is stored, processed and maybe even passed on to other
services.
A user has currently little control over how her conversa-
tions are treated. Not all PVAs are owned or managed by
the user, and she is normally not in control of back-end
systems and has no influence over how the services exchange
conversation recordings. For example, when meeting people
the user can switch off her own phone-based PVA but cannot
control PVAs of others.
We argue that users desire more control on how their
conversations are processed by PVAs. We propose to embed
additional information (referred to as tag) into acoustic signals
which can then be interpreted by the systems to implement
security and privacy requirements of involved parties.
Many methods to generate acoustic tags exist, ranging from
a simple signal overlay to a hidden acoustic watermark [1],
which in turn are suitable for different application scenarios.
For example, a simple acoustic tag can be employed by
users to signal that they have given no consent to recording,
processing and distribution of conversations recorded in their
presence. A cooperating PVA back end looking out for such
tags may then not process the recorded audio to honor the
wishes of individuals. An acoustic watermark hidden within a
recorded audio sample may be used by individuals to identify
the origin of recorded speech at a later stage; it might give
individuals an opportunity to keep track of recordings they
have never agreed to. In such a scenario, cooperation of the
PVA back end is not necessary.
Besides the design of a tag and its usage, there is also the
question of how the acoustic tag is generated. A device is
needed to generate the tagging signal; a likely candidate is
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a mobile phone with a suitable app. As it is not efficient to
continuously transmit tag information, it must be determined
when to emit a tag signal. This can be solved by having a
tagging device listening for the same wake words as the PVA.
Finally, as multiple users may want to tag, collisions must be
avoided and a tagging protocol must be established.
This work explores the aforementioned design space of
acoustic tagging for PVAs. Specifically we investigate:
• Tagging Applications: We give a description of applica-
tion scenarios in which acoustic tagging can address user
privacy and security concerns.
• Tagging Signals and Protocols: We provide a classi-
fication of tagging options and describe protocols for
embedding tags of multiple users.
• Tagging Evaluation: We provide an evaluation of the
signal path for simple overlay tagging using Google
Home Mini. We show that tagging signals in the range
between 4kHz and around 7.2kHz are usable.
• Tagging Prototype: We describe our prototype tagging
device based on PocketSphinx [2] and an evaluation of
the system. The prototype shows that tagging can be used
to signal non-consent in public spaces.
II. PERSONAL VOICE ASSISTANT (PVA)
The operation cycle of a PVA, shown in Figure 1, consists
of two phases: activation phase and recognition phase.
In the activation phase the PVA waits for a user to activate
voice recognition. In light of practicality, most systems utilize
a wake word mechanism. The wake words may be speaker-
dependent or speaker-independent [3].
On activation the PVA enters the recognition phase. In most
scenarios, the PVAs streams the audio signals following the
wake word to a back end for analysis. A response might be
sent to the local device or another action may be triggered.
The captured audio streams are stored by PVA providers,
and the storage duration and the specific usage of the data is
not clearly articulated [4]–[6].
III. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Acoustic tagging in the context of PVAs can be used for a

























Fig. 1: The workflow of a personal voice assistant, without or with
a tagging device.
Signalling Recording Consent: People generally object to
conversations being recorded without their given consent. An
acoustic tag will be emitted by users who give no recording
consent. Any PVA system detecting a tag could then refrain
from processing or even recording a conversation.
Recording Identification: It is reasonable to assume that
conversations are recorded (by accident or on purpose) without
consent by nearby PVAs. Such recordings may later be used
and it might be desirable to identify the context (e.g., location,
time, participants) of the conversation.
Data Trading: PVAs store conversation recordings on
back-end systems. This data is an asset and the service
providers employ it to improve their offerings. A provider may
tag samples in order to control further distribution or to simply
mark the sample source.
IV. TAGGING OPTIONS
Audible Tag: A tag is embedded and its presence is
clearly audible, e.g., in the form of audible noise.
Unnoticeable Tag: The tag is added to the audio signal
such that its presence is not noticeable to a human.
Inaudible Tag: This approach is similar to the unnotice-
able tag. The tag is added to the audio signal such that it
cannot be perceived by a human.
Hidden Tag: The tag is added to the audio signal such
that it cannot be perceived by the user. In addition, it cannot be
determined by other tools (e.g., spectrum analyzer, frequency
analysis) that a tag is embedded in the signal.
V. TAGGING ANALYSIS
We use a common PVA, the Google Home Mini, to evaluate
tagging performance. The aim is to determine the usable
tagging frequency range and to evaluate tag signal distortion.
We use the software Audacity to evaluate the MP3 recording
and find it to be a stereo, 16kHz MP3 format. The audio signal
passes through a low-pass filter which attenuates frequency
elements higher than 8 kHz. Due to practical non-ideal low-
pass filters, the attenuation will also affect frequencies just
below 8 kHz.
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Fig. 3: The spectrogram of the downloaded signal resulting from the
prototype tagging system
The sampling frequency of the audio encoding is 16kHz,
which means ideally all of the audio contents below 8kHz
should be retained. However, only the audio contents below
7.2kHz remains, and we assume this may result from the
unavoidable imperfection of the filter design.
VI. A PROTOTYPE TAGGING SYSTEM
As the hardware platform we select a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B+ with a simple USB microphone and a commodity speaker.
To evaluate the tagging device we use the experiment setup
shown in Fig 2. A Google Home Mini is used as the PVA and
the tagging device with speaker and microphone are placed
next to it.
The tag, an audible multi-tone signal, lasts one second. We
then speak the sentence “Hey Google, when is your birthday?”
to test the system. The wake word is recognized by the PVA
and as well as the tagging device which emits the tag signal.
Thereafter we use Google's Myactivity website to download
the recording. Figure 3 is the spectrogram of the audio file
representing the whole experiment.
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